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I. INTRODUCTION
America was in shock after the tragic and horrific events of September
11, 2001 ("9/11 ").1 The nation's leaders, Democrats and Republicans, were
united with the shared goal of ensuring that such a devastating attack would
never happen again.2 With this motivation, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which merged twenty-two existing agencies and
3services into a single federal department. It was envisioned that this new
Department of Homeland Security ("the Department" or "DHS") would
strengthen the agencies and services responsible for domestic security by
allowing them to more effectively coordinate their efforts through a single,
centralized federal department.4
Despite the clear bipartisan mandate to bolster and centralize federal
homeland security functions, the Department almost immediately became
ground zero for an unprecedented experiment in privatization within the
federal government.5 The Federal Protective Service ("FPS") is one of the
services that merged into DHS.6 Even before the creation of the DHS, FPS
was primarily responsible for protecting federal facilities across the nation.
Ironically, FPS, a service that has always been essential to homeland
§ecurity, is now among the most severely reduced and outsourced services
since the formation of DHS.8 This Article identifies the laws and
1. Joseph I. Liebman, 9-11's Impact on the Practice of Customs Laws, 18 SAINT JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 126 (2003) (identifying serious fears that surfaced immediately after the tragic
events of9/1 1).
2. See David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security Policy in A
Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 206 (2008).
3. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § Ill (LexisNexis 2002) (stating the purposes
for establishing the Department of Homeland Security); Bennie G. Thompson, A Legislative
Prescription for Confronting 21st-Century Risks to the Homeland, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281
(2010).
4. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § II l(b)(l)(D).
5. See Abigail Clark, Note, Reclaiming the Moral High Ground. U.S. Accountability for
Contractor Abuses As A Means to Win Back Hearts and Minds, 38 PUB. CONT. L. J. 709, 713 (2009)
(describing the recent history for wanting to privatize government after the tragic events of 9/11 and the
Bush administration's embrace of this philosophy); Henry S. Kenyon, Department of Homeland Security
Takes Shape, AFCEA.ORG (Feb. 2003), http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=department-homeland-secu
rity-takes-shape.
6. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-235T, HOMELAND SECURITY: FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE CONTINUES TO FACE CHALLENGES WITH CONTRACT GUARDS AND RISK
ASSESSMENTS AT FEDERAL FACILITIES (2013) [hereinafter GAO-14-235T].
7. Id.; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of2010, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (the
Appropriations Act moved FPS from ICE to the National Protection and Programs Directorate to receive
funds as proscribed by the Act, thus effectively transferring the agency to another umbrella); Secretary
Napolitano Announces Transfer of Federal Protective Service to National Protection and Programs
Directorate, DEP'T HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 29, 2008), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/10/29/transfer-
federal-protective-service-national-protection-and-programs-directorate.
8. See GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 2; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-476T,
HOMELAND SECURITY: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION ON THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE'S EFFORTS
TO PROTECT FEDERAL PROPERTY 5 (2008) [hereinafter GAO-08-476T] ("FPS' workforce has decreased
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governmental actions that have helped create real gaps in homeland security
and suggests that the excessive delegation of FPS's vital security functions
to private contractors should be treated as an unconstitutional delegation of
an inherently governmental function.
9
In the wake of the now infamous Blackwater scandal, there is justified
concern regarding private security contractors overstepping their authority
to violate basic human and civil rights.'0  In the context of FPS
privatization, we observe the opposite problem." Unlike the Blackwater
situation, which involved the overzealous use of government power by
private contractors, FPS's private contractors have been investigated for
failing to provide adequate security.12 As the force of highly trained federal
police officers and inspectors has decreased, the number of private security
guards has more than doubled, and thus effectively replaced the federal
officers.13  This is not a coincidence but part of an obvious (yet
unannounced) policy experiment by the Bush Administration, which was
responsible for executing the original formation of the Department.14 The
philosophy behind this policy experiment in privatization ultimately
contemplated complete and total outsourcing of the FPS homeland security
functions to private contractors.5
Private security contractors have fallen short of the elite level of
security previously provided by the highly trained federal police officers.
16
For example, privately contracted FPS security guards failed to pursue or
by nearly 20 percent from almost 1,400 in fiscal year 2004 to about 1,100 at the end of fiscal year
2007."); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-07-05, THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE NEEDS TO
IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF THE CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter OIG-07-05]
(discussing how FPS guards has been outsourced and many of the problems with such outsourcing of
private contractors).
9. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 111-13 ("The primary mission of the
Department is to ... carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting
as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning .. "); see also Dara Kay
Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59
STAN. L. REV. 673, 697 (2006) (The Homeland Security Act contains "detailed provisions governing a
plethora of other agencies transferred to the new Department."); Thompson, supra note 3, at 281-82
(after the attacks of September 11, Congress quickly merged twenty-two disparate agencies to form
DHS); Raphael Perl, The Department of Homeland Security: Background and Challenges, in
TERRORISM: REDUCING VULNERABILITIES AND IMPROVING RESPONSES 176, 177 (2004).
10. See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow ofState Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 133 (2010)
("The contractors 'opened fire with automatic weapons and grenade launchers on unarmed civilians
located in and around Nisur Square in central Baghdad,"' killing, wounding, and assaulting numerous
civilians.).
11. GAO-08-467T, supra note 8, at 13.
12. Id; The Federal Protective Service: Time for Reform Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111 th Cong. 1-2 (2009) [hereinafter The Federal
Protective Service: Time for Reform].
13. See GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 6.
14. Kenyon, supra note 5.
15. Id.
16. See GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 13.
2016]
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
even confront suspects as they fled secured federal facilities with sensitive
information and $500,000 worth of surveillance equipment.17  This raises
serious concerns regarding the efficacy and legality of continuing to
delegate this vital homeland security function to private security
contractors. 18
This Article reveals the real security gaps in FPS and suggests that the
enormous delegation of FPS's vital security functions to private contractors
should be treated as an unconstitutional delegation of an inherently
governmental function.19  However, the current constitutional doctrine
regarding inherently governmental functions is so weak that even this
obvious example of a vital security function that ought to be performed by
government fails to satisfy the current constitutional standard for being
inherently governmental.2 °
Part II presents the FPS federal infrastructure mission and the real
homeland security gaps created by post 9/11 policies that have undermined
FPS security capabilities.21 Part II demonstrates that these homeland
security gaps outweigh the structural and budgetary concerns that have been
used to justify the widespread delegation of federal security to private
contractors.22
Part III analyzes the legal authority for FPS privatization and recognizes
that the current excessive privatization and its resulting homeland security
gaps is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the DHS Act.23 Despite
17. Id.
18. Id.; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-0859T, HOMELAND SECURITY:
PRELIMINARY RESULTS SHOW FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE'S ABILITY TO PROTECT FEDERAL
FACILITIES IS HAMPERED BY WEAKNESSES IN ITS CONTRACT SECURITY GUARD PROGRAM 15 (2009) (at
site field tests where real bomb parts were being smuggled passed security and security let persons
through with bomb parts going unnoticed).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal Justice
Privatization, U. CH1. LEGAL F. 265, 286-89, 293 (2010).
21. See infra Part i1. As an example:
DHS transferred emergency supplemental funding, and FPS instituted a number of
cost-saving measures to address its budgetary challenges, such as restricting hiring
and travel, limiting training and overtime, and suspending employee performance
awards. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on
staff morale, are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates, and could
reduce the performance and safety of FPS personnel.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-683, HOMELAND SECURITY: THE FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE FACES SEVERAL CHALLENGES THAT HAMPER ITS ABILITY TO PROTECT FEDERAL
FACILITIES 4 (2008) [hereinafter GAO-08-683]; see also The Federal Protective Service: Time for
Reform, supra note 12, at 1-2 (Senator Joseph I. Lieberman's opening statement pointing out that the
"Federal Protective Service agency has suffered serious budget shortfalls in recent years which forced it
to limit hiring, training, and overtime, and to delay equipment purchases ....
22. See infra Part 1I.
23. See infra Part III.
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Congress's legislative intent, the Department has broad legal authority to
privatize under statutory law and this does not violate executive branch
policies regarding privatization.24
Part IV considers the constitutional law concerns that excessive
privatization raises and suggests that, despite judicial reluctance to enforce a
limit on privatization based on the nondelegation doctrine, limitations
should bar privatizing the FPS to the point that homeland security is
severely undermined.25 The privatization of government-here, through the
expansive and broad privatization of the FPS security functions-
undermines our core precepts regarding democratic governance and our
constitutional structure.
26
II. PRIVATIZATION OF FPS HAS CREATED REAL HOMELAND SECURITY
GAPS
The FPS federal infrastructure mission is a vital homeland security
function.2 7 The current gaps created by excessive privatization are the result
of consistent and longstanding failures to properly train and manage private
security guards.28
A. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) Security Function
Long before 9/11 and the creation of DHS, the FPS's primary function
was to protect important federal facilities.29 FPS was established in 1971 as
the uniformed protection force of the General Services Administration
("GSA") for government-occupied facilities.30 FPS's current mission is to
protect approximately 9,000 GSA federal facilities including but not limited
24. Fairfax, supra note 20, at 286-89, 293.
25. See infra Part IV; PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATEN DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 113 (2007).
26. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY
170-71, 213-15 (2008) (arguing that private military and national security firms pose a threat to
government's sovereignty and privatization has detrimental implications for democracy). Indeed, this
appeals to the proposition argued by some scholars that:
[John] Locke opposed unauthorized law-or rulemaking, that is, lawmaking by an
institution not authorized by the people to engage in such lawmaking. He was not
merely opposing the power to convey votes in a legislature.
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1329 (2003).
27. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-12-100, EFFECTS OF SECURITY LAPSE ON FPS'
MICHIGAN GUARD SERVICES CONTRACT (REDACTED) 2 (2012) [hereinafter OIG- 12-100].
28. GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 4-8.
29. Jarecki v. United States, 590 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1979) (Federal officers were put into
Federal building to protect it from terrorist attack).
30. Id.
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to the federal courts, district offices for Members of Congress, and the
Social Security Administration Offices.31 FPS's protection services focus
directly on the interior security of the nation and require close coordination
and intelligence-sharing with the investigative functions within DHS.32 FPS
is a full service operation with a comprehensive HAZMAT, Weapons of
Mass Destruction ("WMD"), canine, and emergency response program as
well as state-of-the-art communication and dispatch Mega Centers.33 These
FPS functions are necessary to ensure the safety of federal buildings and are
essential to the Department's fundamental homeland security mission and
duties.34
The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City ("Oklahoma City Bombing") inspired Congress to enhance
FPS's ability to properly fulfill its federal facility protection mission.35
GSA and Congress determined that FPS needed more federal workers in
order to fully protect the nation's federal facilities.36 FPS was required to
increase its federal workforce to 1,480 personnel.37 This represented a
significant increase from the approximately 980 federal full-time FPS
workers (referred to as full-time equivalents ("FTEs")) at the time of the
Oklahoma City Bombing.38 After the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, under which the Department became
responsible for protecting buildings, grounds, and property of the federal
31. OIG-12-100, supra note 27, at 2; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-943T,
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS ON EFFORTS TO ASSESS FACILITY RISKS AND
OVERSEE CONTRACT GUARDS 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-i 2-943T].
32. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1.
33. See The Federal Protective Service, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/topic/
federal-protective-service (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
34. See id.
35. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-341, HOMELAND SECURITY: FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE'S CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM REQUIRES MORE OVERSIGHT AND
REASSESSMENT OF USE OF CONTRACT GUARDS 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAO- 10-341]. Starting in 1995:
FPS has relied on a substantial contract guard force to help accomplish its mission
of protecting federal facilities. The level of security FPS provides at each of the
9,000 federal facilities varies depending on the building's security level. While
the contractor has the primary responsibility for training and ensuring that the
guards have met certification requirements, FPS is ultimately responsible for
oversight of the guards and relies on about 752 inspectors located in its 11 regions
to inspect guard posts and verify that training, certifications, and time cards are
accurate. It is also responsible for providing X-ray and magnetometer training to
the guards.
Id.
36. The Direction and Viability of the Federal Protective Service Before the H. Comm. on
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government.39  Effective March 1, 2003, FPS was moved from GSA's
Public Building Services to the Department.4 °  By 2004, FPS had
substantially decreased its employees to 1,400.4 1  Between 2004 and 2007,
the FPS employees decreased from 1,400 to only 1,100.42
These decreases in the FPS workforce after 9/11 are inconsistent with
the unambiguous congressional mandate to strengthen homeland security-
highly trained federal officers were replaced with less competent security
personnel.43  Although FPS was moved to DHS to enhance elite federal
protection, highly trained federal police have been replaced with what are at
times poorly trained, private contractors, who have been pejoratively
referred to as toy cops or rent-a-cops.44
FPS collects security fees from the agencies that reside in the federal
facilities it protects, but the collected fees are insufficient to fully sustain the
FPS in its important national security function.45  Even before joining the
Department, the revenue from the security fees was not sufficient to cover
FPS operational costs.4 6 Before FPS joined the Department, GSA made up
for the difference between FPS revenues and FPS operational costs by
shifting additional funding from the GSA Federal Buildings Fund.47  This
additional GSA funding has not been available to FPS since 2004, which
39. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 111; 6 U.S.C.S. § 232 (2002 LexisNexis)
("Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect the functions or authorities of the Administrator of
General Services with respect to the operation, maintenance, and protection of buildings and grounds
owned or occupied by the Federal Government and under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the
Administrator.").
40. GAO-08-476T, SUPRA NOTE 8, AT 1.
41. ID. AT 5.
42. ID. As explained by Mark Goldstein:
FPS faces several unresolved workforce issues. First, FPS' workforce has
decreased by about 20 percent since fiscal year 2004 from almost 1,400 to about
1,100 in fiscal year 2007 .... During this timeframe, the number of employees in
each position also decreased, with the largest decrease occurring in the police
officer position. For example, based on FPS reports, the number of police officers
decreased from 359 in fiscal year 2004 to 215 in fiscal year 2007 and the number
of inspectors (sometimes referred to as physical security specialists) decreased
from 600 in fiscal year 2004 to 541 in fiscal year 2007 .... According to FPS
officials, the decreases in FPS' workforce are primarily the result of cost saving
measures taken to address its budgetary challenges.
Id. at 5-7.
43. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 281; GAO-08-476T, SUPRA NOTE 8, AT 5, 13.
44. See GAO-08-476T, SUPRA NOTE 8, AT 12-14; Brock N. Meeks, Are 'rent-a-cops' threatening
security?, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2005, 5:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7092909/ns/us-news-
security/t/are-rent-a-cops-threatening-security/#.VrbaqLKDGko.
45. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-492, BUDGET ISSUE: BETTER FEE
DESIGN WOULD IMPROVE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE'S AND FEDERAL AGENCIES' PLANNING AND
BUDGETING FOR SECURITY 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter GAO- 11-492].
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
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has caused FPS to experience significant budget shortfalls.48 During the
Bush Administration and throughout the Obama Administration, FPS has
continued to experience budget shortfalls.49 As cost-saving measures, FPS
has restricted training, hiring, and travel, and has limited and eliminated
overtime and employee performance awards."' According to one
Government Accountability Office ("GAO") report:
For example, DHS transferred emergency supplemental
funding, and FPS instituted a number of cost-saving
measures to address its budgetary challenges, such as
restricting hiring and travel, limiting training and overtime,
and suspending employee performance awards. According
to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect
on staff morale, are partially responsible for FPS's high
attrition rates, and could reduce the performance and safety
of FPS personnel. I
The inadequate funding mechanisms and the resulting cost-savings
measures raise serious questions regarding FPS's continuing ability to
perform its important homeland security function.52
To gain additional cost-savings, FPS enacted hiring restrictions that
have led FPS to increasingly rely upon private security guards and
contractors as ostensibly lower cost alternatives to FPS police officers in
deterring security threats in and around federal buildings.53 Ironically, since
joining DHS, the FPS workforce reduced from 1,400 employees at the end
of 2004 to approximately 1,100 employees at the end of 2007.54 Under this
approach, FPS eliminated its police officer position and is primarily using
about 752 inspectors and special agents.55 These inspectors and special
agents oversee 15,000 contract guards, provide law enforcement services,
conduct building security assessments, and perform other duties as assigned.
56 As of December 17, 2013, the number of inspectors and special agents
modestly increased to approximately 1,200 FTEs, a number that is dwarfed
48. Id. (discussing the difficulties that FPS faces due to reduction in workforce, elimination of
police officer positions, and reduction of funding).
49. Id.
50. GAO-08-683, supra note 21, at 4; The Federal Protective Service: Time for Reform, supra
note 12, at 2.
51. GAO-08-683, supra note 21, at 4.
52. See GAO-08-476T,supra note 8, at 11-12; GAO-09-859T, supra note 18, at 2.
53. See SHAWN REESE, THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND CONTRACT SECURITY GUARDS:
A STATUTORY HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS 4 (2009).
54. GAO-08-683, supra note 21, at 3.
55. GAO-10-341, supra note 35, at 22.
56. Id.
[Vol. 42
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by the 13,500 private security guards FPS currently has under contract.57
Mark Goldstein, GAO Director for Critical Infrastructure Issues, testified to
Congress:
To accomplish its facility protection mission, FPS has about
1,200 full-time employees and approximately 13,200
contract security guards. FPS has an annual budget of
about $1 billion and receives its funding from the revenues
and collections of security fees charged to tenant agencies
for protective services such as facility security assessments
(FSA) and providing contract security guard services.
Since 2008, we have issued numerous reports that address
major challenges FPS faces in protecting federal facilities.
For example, in 2009 and 2010 we reported that FPS had
problems completing high-quality FSAs in a timely manner
and did not provide adequate oversight of its contract guard
program.58
DHS has jeopardized homeland security in its attempts to replace
professional, federally-trained FPS security personnel with private
contractors.59
Congress has attempted to aid FPS by requiring Homeland Security to
maintain a minimum number of full-time equivalents.60  However, during
the years that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") housed
the FPS,6 1 ICE did not allocate sufficient funds to support the FPS
mission.62 Instead, it engaged in so-called "cost-savings" through
privatization and reduction of FPS's federal workforce;63 however, no long-
57. GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 1-2; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I 1-705R,
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE ACTIONS NEEDED TO RESOLVE DELAYS AND INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT
ISSUES WITH FPS's RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO-I1-
705R].
58. GAO-I 1-705R, supra note 57, at 1; see GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 1-2.
59. See Federal Protective Service: Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical
Facilities? Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec., lllth Cong. 45 (2010) [hereinafter Would
Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?]. "ICE is the largest investigative
component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the second largest investigative agency
in the federal government, with more than 20,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $5.7
billion." AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION EMPLOYMENT COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 62
(2012).
60. See Proposals to Downsize the Federal Protective Service and Effects on the Protection of
Federal Buildings Before the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, I 10th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter
Proposals to Downsize].
61. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1.
62. See id at 11.
63. See id. at 1-2; Federal Protective Service: Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition
and Impede Progress? Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111 th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Rand
Beers, Under Secretary, National Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security) (The FPS
2016]
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term savings have been realized.64 As the opinion of the Office of the
Inspector General indicates, FPS still encounters budget shortfalls as a result
of its initiative to hire more contract guards instead of federally-trained
officers.65
Nonetheless, this was consistent with an unstated, but structurally
implemented, goal of reducing and eventually eliminating the FPS federal
workforce by housing FPS within the unrelated agency structure of ICE.66
This intentional misplacement of a service responsible for securing federal
buildings, within the agency responsible for immigration and customs,
created a powerful structural incentive to outsource FPS security functions
as much as possible.6'
Congress went to great lengths to preserve FPS's effectiveness by
passing the DHS Appropriations legislation for the 2010 fiscal year.68 This
legislation transferred FPS out of the ICE Directorate into a newly formed
National Protections Programs Directorate, thereby showing that the
administration is constantly striving to privatize this entity.69  The
administration's goal of privatizing FPS undermined its effective
management.
70
GAO, the nonpartisan congressional agency that monitors and
investigates the use of federal funds, has been referred to as the
"congressional watchdog" because it gathers information on agency
effectiveness and evaluates whether government programs and policies are
meeting their objectives and providing good public services.7' GAO also
investigates allegations of illegal or improper activities and provides legal
transfer from ICE to NPPD was effectuated with the signing of the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of
Homeland Security Act of 2010, which was signed into law on October 28, 2009) [hereinafter Will
Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition and Impede Progress?].
64. See Proposals to Downsize, supra note 60, at 2-3; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-13-694, CHALLENGES WITH OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM STILL EXIST, AND
ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT CONTROLS ARE NEEDED 4 (2013) [hereinafter GAO-13-694]; GAO-Il-
492, supra note 45, at 1-2.
65. See OIG-07-05, supra note 8, at 2; GAO-I 1-492, supra note 45, at 1-2.
66. See REESE, supra note 53, at 1, 4; OIG-07-05, supra note 8, at 2.
67. See REESE, supra note 53, at 1.
68. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-554, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE:
PROGRESS MADE BUT IMPROVED SCHEDULE AND COST ESTIMATE NEEDED TO COMPLETE TRANSITION
1-2 (2011).
69. See id; GAO-13-694, supra note 64, at 6; see generally Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2010, H.R. 2892, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
70. See GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at I (Showing how privatization has led to more structural
encumbrances and problems to effectively provide security and run FPS); GAO-08-476T, supra note 8,
at 13.
71. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., U.S. GOV'T
MANUAL 48 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. GOV'T MANUAL]; see Noah B. Bleicher et al., Accountability in
Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracting: The Multifaceted Work of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 37 PUB. CONT. L. J. 375,375-76 (2007).
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decisions and opinions.7 2 GAO has released reports and statements
describing the Homeland Security failures that resulted from its reliance on
private security contractors and contract guards.73
Private security guards and contractors are now almost entirely
responsible for screening entrants into critical federal infrastructure and
must often operate security-screening devices such as magnetometers and x-
ray machines.14 Given the budget-based cuts to the FPS workforce and the
reduced hours for FPS police operations, private security guards and
contractors are now largely responsible for monitoring federal buildings and
are deployed at roving and fixed posts.75  Private security guards and
contractors play highly visible roles and are often the first and only contact
employees and visitors have with FPS at a facility. 76 Despite their vital
roles, private security guards and contractors do not have any more law
enforcement authority than the power to detain and make an ordinary
citizen's arrest.77 As has been noted in a study by the GAO, private security
guards and contractors have shown a marked reluctance to exercise even
this limited authority.78
B. Homeland Security Gaps
The earlier listed gaps in management and oversight have led to
problematic security consequences.79 Both the GAO and the Department's
own Inspector General, have investigated and exposed examples of
Homeland Security gaps and failures within the FPS contract guard
program.80  The GAO's report, Homeland Security. Preliminary
Observations in the Federal Protective Service's Efforts to Protect Federal
Property, cites examples of private security guards and contractors
neglecting to take action when suspects entered the buildings with illegal
weapons, stole valuable federal property, and fled from an FPS inspector.8'
Regarding the theft of a law enforcement surveillance trailer, the GAO
reported, "The federal law enforcement agency did not realize [a
surveillance] trailer was missing until three days later. Only after the
72. U.S. GoV'T MANUAL, supra note 71, at 48.
73. See, e.g., GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 13; GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 6; GAO-09-
859T, supra note 18, at 4-6.
74. GAO-09-859T, supra note 18, at 2; GAO-10-341, supra note 35, at 4; Would Federalization
of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?, supra note 59, at 5 (statement of Gary W. Schenkel).
75. OIG-07-05, supra note 8, at 2.
76. See Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?, supra note 59,
at 9 (statement of Mark L. Goldstein).
77. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 4.
78. Id. at 13.
79. See id.
80. See id; GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 6; GAO-09-859T, supra note 18, at 4-6.
81. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 13.
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federal law enforcement agency started making inquiries did the guards
report the theft to that agency and FPS.,,82 Leaving aside the obvious
problems with the failure to stop or deter the theft of sensitive surveillance
equipment, the failure to report the problem to law enforcement until
questioned by the agency three days later is a far larger problem.
The same GAO report acknowledges that "[d]uring another incident,
FPS officials reported contract guards-who were armed-taking no action
as a shirtless suspect wearing handcuffs on one arm ran through the lobby of
a level IV building while being chased by a FPS inspector."8' 3 This GAO
report further notes:
GAO officials personally witnessed an incident in which an
individual attempted to enter a level IV facility with illegal
weapons. According to FPS policies, contract guards are
required to confiscate illegal weapons, detain and question
the individual, and to notify FPS. In this instance, the
weapons were not confiscated, the individual was not
detained or questioned, FPS was not notified, and the
individual was allowed to leave with the weapons.84
Another problematic occurrence is noted in a DHS Inspector General's
Report that notes that, "[o]n February 26, 2011, a person placed a bag
containing an improvised explosive device [IED] outside the Patrick V.
McNamara Federal Building in Detroit, Michigan.' '85 A private security
guard, hired by FPS contractor DECO Inc. to secure the building, brought
the bag containing the LED into the facility and placed it under a screening
console desk at an entry point to the building.86 The bag was held at this
vulnerable location inside the federal building until they came to realize that
the bag contained an IED on March 18, 2011.87 The guards had no
knowledge that, for twenty-one days, they were holding a potential bomb at
one of the facility's screening points.8  The DHS Inspector General's
investigation of this incident concluded that DECO breached its contract,
but also concluded that FPS bears some responsibility for allowing the bag




85. OIG-12-100, supra note 27, at 1.
86. Id.; Guards Fired After Bomb Goes Unnoticed at Federal Building in Detroit, NEWKERALA,
http://www.newkerala.com/news/newsplus/worldnews-64665.html#.UF4CkY2PVKI (last visited Mar. 1,
2016).
87. OIG-12-100, supra note 27, at 1, 6.
88. Id. at 1, 6-7.
89. Id. at 1,4.
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In addition to the breach of its security obligations under its contract
with the government, the Inspector General found that DECO lacked
sufficient oversight from FPS.90  The Inspector General and GAO
investigators often find insufficient FPS oversight of its contractors, which
exemplifies the FPS security gaps.91 In fact, this is a common investigative
finding in reviews of privatization throughout DHS and in other
departments and agencies.92 As with many other situations where the
Inspector General or GAO finds shared responsibility for the security
failures, in this case the private contractor's contract with the government
agency continued.
93
The Inspector General's report claims that continuing DECO's contract
was "advantageous for the government.,94 This raises the question-how
do DHS and FPS define "advantageous?" Given the public security interest
involved, "advantageous" should encompass more than short-term
economic calculations.95  The report indicates that more than mere
economic justifications drove the continuation of the contract.96  This
suggests that while the contractor did all that it could, FPS's training gaps
greatly contributed to the problem.97 Furthermore, the report suggests that
the contractor received high ratings from FPS in the past.98
Paul Verkuil has written about failures similar to the DECO bag
scenario.99 Such failures have led Verkuil to challenge the conventional
wisdom that privatization's failures primarily result from administrative
oversight.00 The frequency of such failures across federal agencies and
departments suggests that such failures in privatization are the direct and
expected result of excessive delegation of public functions.°1 The question
remains as to whether the delegation of the vital FPS security function
violates federal law.
90. Id. at 3.
91. See OIG-07-05, supra note 8, at 1, 4, 14; GAO-09-859T, supra note 18, at 1, 4-6 (Some
examples of these findings were when an armed guard fell asleep at his post after taking Percocet pain
killers, a guard was caught using government computers to manage a private for profit adult website,
guards did not recognize or properly x-ray a box containing semi-automatic handguns at the loading
dock, GAO investigators walked past guards and then assembled lED explosive devices concealed on
their persons and walked freely through the facility with an IED in a briefcase, and a guard failed to stop
an infant carrier from being put through an x-ray machine).
92. GAO-12-943T, supra note 31, 1,4, 8.
93. OIG-12-100, supra note 27, at 3.
94. Id. at 1, 12.
95. See id at 12.
96. See id
97. See id at 1, 12.
98. See OIG-12-100, supra note 27, at 13.
99. See generally VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25.
100. See id at 148-50.
101. Seeid at 108-09.
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C. Failures in Training Contract Guards
Security failures such as those described above would have been
troubling even before 9/11 102 In today's world, these security failures are
all the more problematic given that improving security was the primary
motivation for transferring FPS, along with twenty-two other federal
agencies and services, into the Department.
10 3
[A]ccording to FPS officials, contract guards generally do
not have the training to detect suspicious terrorist or
criminal activity .... [O]fficials reported instances in which
large trucks or suspicious individuals were parked outside
federal facilities for long periods of time without being
approached by guards.
10 4
Even under the best of circumstances, private security guards'
capabilities are relatively limited.105 Naturally, requiring private security
guards to perform vital security functions that go beyond the scope of their
actual abilities undermines security.106 Federal investigations of the FPS
have revealed that private security guards lack the requisite abilities and
have not received basic training certifications, let alone specific training
regarding screening entry into federal buildings and active-shooters.107
1. Training Certifications and Fitness Determinations
In an attempt to ensure that the private security guards are properly
trained, FPS contracts require that guards obtain specific training
certifications and satisfy certain employee fitness determinations.10 8 Yet
according to Congress's auditor, the GAO:
FPS continues to experience difficulty ensuring that its
[contract] guards have the required training and
certifications. . . . FPS requires that [contract guards] all
undergo employee fitness determinations and complete 120
102. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 281-82.
103. Id. (after the attacks of September 11, Congress quickly merged twenty-two disparate
agencies to form DHS).
104. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 14.
105. GAO 10-34 1, SUPRA NOTE 35, AT 5 (this report shows what the guards can do and the fact that
there is actually very little power in their jobs, especially with arrest capabilities and detaining).
106. Id. at 8.
107. GAO-13-694, supra note 64, at 9, 11-12, 15, 21; GAO- 14-235T, supra note 6, at 2.
108. GAO-10-341, SUPRA NOTE 35, at 8.
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hours of training provided by the contractor and FPS,
including basic training and firearms training.'0 9
For example, FPS requires that each private security guard complete
approximately 120 hours of training "including basic training, firearms
training, and screener (X-ray and magnetometer) training."" 0  Yet
according to a 2013 GAO report, nearly a quarter, 23%, of the private
security guard files GAO reviewed did not contain the required training and
certification documentation." '
2. Screener Training
As mentioned, some FPS contract guards have not received required
screener training112 As part of their 120 hours of training, guards are
required to receive: "8 hours of screener training from FPS on how to use x-
ray and magnetometer equipment. . . . Screener training is important
because many guards control access points at federal facilities and thus must
be able to properly operate [these] machines and understand their
results."' 3
In 2009 and 2010, GAO reported, "FPS had not provided screener
training to 1,500 contract guards in one FPS region."'" 4 Because of the
oversight problems stated earlier, GAO could not determine the extent to
which FPS guards are still not receiving screener training." 5 However,
GAO provided some useful examples:
[A]n official at one contract guard company stated that 133
of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three
separate contracts ... have never received their initial x-ray
and magnetometer training from FPS. The official stated
that some of these guards are working at screening posts...
. Further, officials at another contract guard company in a
different FPS region stated that, according to their records,
78 of 295 (about 26 percent) guards deployed under their
contract have never received magnetometer training. '
6
109. GAO-I 4-235T, supra note 6, at 2.
110. GAO-13-694, supra note 64, at 7.
111. Id. at 14.
112. See GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5-6.
116. Id. at 6.
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The concern was that some deployed guards do not know how to use
the screening equipment and hence are not capable of "properly screen[ing]
access control points at federal facilities."'17  This failure in training is
significant-conducting proper screening at access points prevents the
introduction of weapons, explosives, etc., and provides emergency-situation
instruction.118 Case in point: when FPS officers stationed at an access point
allowed an individual to enter and exit the facility with illegal weapons."9
They did not detain the individual, confiscate the weapons, or even report
the incident-the individual simply left the building.12 0 As described in the
2013 report, the greatest problem in screener training is that while regional
FPS management is aware that these contract guards have undertaken little
to no training, they still allow such guards to work under contract. 2
Because FPS lacks effective management controls and a comprehensive
guard management system, it cannot ensure that these companies have met




FPS specifically requires training to prepare security guards to handle a
hostile intruder who is firing a weapon at a federal facility-the so-called
active-shooter scenario.124 The DHS has defined an "active-shooter" as "an
individual killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated
area." 25 In its 2013 report, GAO noted that "[s]ince June 2009 there have
been several incidents involving active-shooters at government facilities."'
126
One example of a tragic active-shooter scenario is the January 2010
incident at the Lloyd D. George Federal Courthouse in Las Vegas, Nevada,
where a gunman killed a security officer and wounded a deputy U.S.
marshal. 127 Just after 8:00 a.m., a "reckless and callous" gunman opened
fire in the lobby of a federal building in downtown Las Vegas, killing a
sixty-five-year-old court officer and wounding a forty-eight-year-old deputy
marshal before he was eventually shot himself. 28 A Las Vegas police
117. GAO- 14-235T, supra note 6, at 5-6.
118. Id. at2,4-6.
119. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 13.
120. Id.
121. GAO-14-235T, supra note 6, at 5-6.
122. Id.
123. GAO-13-694,supra note 64, at 10.




128. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Two killed in shooting at Las Vegas federal building, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 4, 2010, 4:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 0/jan/04/las-vegas-shooting.
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spokeswoman stated, "[i]t looks like he went in there and just started
unloading."'
129
GAO's 2013 report reads: "FPS faces challenges providing active-
shooter response training to all of its guards. Without ensuring that all
guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents, FPS
has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat.'
30
According to GAO's testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, "[GAO] was unable to determine the
extent to which FPS' guards have received active-shooter esponse training,
in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard
oversight .... ,,131
The GAO accountability reports thus highlight another failure-a
failure in management and oversight of contract guards.1
32
D. Failures in Management and Oversight of Contract Guards
One heading in the 2013 GAO report reads: "FPS Continues to Lack a
Comprehensive System to Effectively Manage Guard Training,
Certification, and Qualification Data."'133  As an example, in July 2009,
GAO reported that sixty-two percent of the contract guards working under
seven of FPS's thirty-eight contractors "had at least one expired
certification.'' 134  The report also provides examples of training and
certification failures including failures to obtain magnetometer and X-ray
screening. 35  It is bad enough that FPS contractors failed to satisfy the
terms of these private contracts, but the fact that FPS took no action against
them and still extended their contracts is even worse.
136
Through its existing contracts, FPS is already capable of taking actions
against guards and guard companies that fail to satisfy its standards, but
apparently does not do so because it lacks the necessary data to formally
129. ASSOCIATED PRESS, I guard, gunman killed in Las Vegas federal building shooting,
GAINESVILLE.COM (Jan. 4, 2010, 11:55 AM), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100104/ARTICLES/
100109879?Title=l -guard-gunman-killed-in-Las-Vegas-federal-building-shooting.
130. GAO-14-235T,supra note 6, at4.
131. Id. at5.
132. 01G-12-100, supra note 27, at 1, 3.
133. GAO-13-694,supra note 64, at 16.
134. GAO-10-341, supra note 35, at 9.
135. Id. at 14-15; see GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 13 (other failures in training supervision due
to privatization of contract guards are: Guard inspections were done over the phone instead of in person,
guards were sleeping on duty, inspectors work very limitedly and cannot enforce change, guards failing
to act in situations of emergency, FPS guards take no actions after shirtless man in handcuffs is being
chased through the building, no action was taken as extremely expensive surveillance is being stolen,
and individuals have been allowed to enter and leave the FPS secured areas with illegal weapons).
136. GAO-10-341, supra note 35, at 11.
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make the determination.3 Indeed, according to Mark Goldstein's
December 2013 testimony, "FPS is not able to provide reasonable assurance
that guards have met training and certification requirements" because of
"the lack of management controls."'
38
Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the solutions, the consistent
failure of the FPS to properly manage its private security contractors
indicates a larger problem than an easily correctable issue of government
management.139  The GAO, as well as the Department's own Inspector
General's Office, have written numerous reports and given congressional
testimony regarding FPS's broad and specific failures to properly manage
its private security contractors.14
0
It appears the larger concern driving the failure to properly manage the
security contractors is excessive privatization.4' Paul Verkuil has written
extensively about the management problems that appear whenever there is
excessive privatization of government functions. 42 According to Verkuil,
one issue is that "[i]n these circumstances, the number of private contractors
doing the work of government will inevitably accelerate to the limits of
federal employees available to supervise them; and may be beyond.'
143
Verkuil additionally explains why "[t]his privatized program raises
significant issues about the DHS's ability to supervise, oversee, and
control."144
The observed reality is that privatizing FPS has resulted in real
homeland security gaps.145  The constant inability of FPS to correct their
137. GAO-13-694,supra note 64, at 20-21.
138. GAO-14-235T,supra note 6, at 8.
139. See Verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 26-30, 96, 105 (discussing the
detrimental effects of outsourcing public services, which includes FPS, the delegation of traditional
military functions to private contractors, the increasing willingness of public officials to outsource
traditionally public functions to private firms, that there is due process limits to privatization and that
this trend is detrimental to democracy).
140. GAO-13-694, supra note 64, at 1, 10 ("For example, an official at one contract guard
company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three separate FPS
contracts . . . never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from EPS."); OIG-12-100,
supra note 27, at 6-7, 9-10 (this report found deficiencies in post inspections, guard training, and
program suitability which contributed a bag containing explosive devises in it attaining access to a FPS
building and remaining there for 21 days); GOA-12-943T, supra note 31, at 8 (this report expressed that
the GAO's investigation at that ime indicated that FPS did not have a comprehensive and reliable
system to oversee its approximately 12,500 contract guards); GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1-2
(reports that due to several management failures FPS' ability to achieve its mission has been hampered
and impeded its ability to decrease the risk of criminal and terrorist attacks on federal employees,
facilities, and members of the public).
141. Verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 6-7, 35; GAO-08-476T, supra note
8, at 1-2.
142. Verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 5-7, 35-37.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 35.
145. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1- 2, 5, 9.
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private contractor's security failures is consistent with Verkuil's research
regarding the expected results of excessive privatization.
146
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PRIVATIZATION
FPS relies on a combination of statutory law, administrative regulations,
and executive orders as the legal authority to hire and utilize private
contractors and security guards to protect federal facilities.147  This section
analyzes congressional intent regarding the formation of the Department
and outsourcing privatization authority under the DHS Act.
A. FPS Privatization Undermines Congressional Intent
The GAO has found that, since FPS's transfer from the GSA to
Homeland Security, security at federal facilities has diminished and the risk
of crime and terrorist attacks at many federal facilities has increased.
48
Despite the broad privatization authority granted under the DHS Act and
related regulations, legislative intent should function as a limit on the scope
of the ongoing delegation of FPS's vital security functions to private
contractors.149  As has been discussed, the DHS Act makes clear that the
Department's primary mission is to protect the nation from terrorist
attacks.5 ° This general purpose indicates a legislative intent to generally
strengthen the security of our nation and, in particular, America's sensitive
federal facilities.' 15  Privatization and related FPS federal employee
workforce reductions should be limited at least to avoid undermining FPS's
essential homeland security mission.'
52
146. GAO-13-694, supra note 64, at 16-17; verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note at
25, at 6-7.
147. See 40 U.S.C.A. § 1315 (West 2015).
148. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1-2.
149. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place For A "Legislative History" Of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 255, 260-61 (2000) (arguing that the court's overemphasis on deferring
to agency interpretation of the enacting act, which is post-promulgation of the act is suspect and that the
courts should resort more to legislative history, floor debates, and pre-promulgation debates and
committee hearings serve guidance as to the legislative intent of how an agency should function); GAO-
08-476T, supra note 8, at 5; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-897T, HOMELAND
SECURITY: THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE FACES SEVERAL CHALLENGES THAT RAISE CONCERNS
ABOUT PROTECTION OF FEDERAL FACILITIES 1 (2008)[hereinafter GAO-08-897T].
150. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 11 l(b)(l)(A)-(C).
151. See GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1; 40 U.S.C.A. § 1315 (a)-(b)(1) (Subsection (a) provides
that DHS in general "shall protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or
secured by the Federal Government" while subsection (b) allows DHS to delegate the task to FPS.).
152. See VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 27-30, 105, 196 (the author
discusses the detrimental effects of outsourcing public services, which includes FPS, and how the
delegation of traditional military functions to private contractors and the increasing willingness of public
officials to outsource traditionally public functions to private firms, that there is due process limits to
privatization and that this trend is detrimental to democracy); Fairfax, supra note 20, at 267-68, 290-93
(stating that the state privatizes its functions to save costs, for necessity of expertise, and efficiency
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In 2002, Tom Ridge, the then Director of the Office of Homeland
Security and later the first Secretary of the Department, remarked: "Since
day one, the primary mission of the Office of Homeland Security has been
to develop a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States
from terrorist attacks and threats."153  This statement acknowledges the
Department's obvious mandate to actually enhance and strengthen
security. 4
The legislative intent behind the Homeland Security Act of 2002
militates against the expansive privatization of federal building security that
has occurred within the FPS.155  Subsequent legislation further bolsters the
logical argument that there was legislative intent to limit privatization that
would undermine FPS's vital homeland security mission.16  The DHS
Appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2010 transferred FPS out of ICE
into a newly formed National Protection and Programs Directorate
("NPPD").1 57 This transfer occurred in direct response to reports regarding
ICE's underfunding and overall neglect of FPS 
58
Janet Napolitano, the Department Secretary, acknowledged the
congressional intent to preserve FPS's viability. 59  In a press release
announcing the transfer of the FPS from ICE to NPPD, Secretary
Napolitano stated: "Securing government facilities is a vital aspect of DHS'
critical infrastructure protection mission .... Transferring FPS to NPPD
among other reasons. However, despite delegating governmental functions under the outsourcing
scheme, the government remains accountable for the performance of those functions. There are several
Government Contracting Law regulations that define inherently governmental activities, including the
FAIR Act of 1998, the Federal Acquisitions and Regulations, and Office of Management and Budget,
and Circular No. A-76. These norms stand for the general proposition that contracts shall not be used for
the performance of inherently governmental functions. The author concludes that is inappropriate to
outsource functions closely identified with state sovereignty); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How
Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 989, 1022-25 (2005) (the author discusses that reliance on private contractors puts democracy in
jeopardy because the idea of checks and balances is lacking and thus privatization creates lack of
transparency).
153. See Press Release, Governor Tom Ridge, Dir. of Homeland Sec., to the Nat'l Ass'n of Broad.
Educ. Found. (Jun. 10, 2002) available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2002/06/print/text/20020610-7.html.
154. See id.
155. See U.S. STATES GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-II -940T, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE AND WORK REMAINING IN IMPLEMENTING HOMELAND
SECURITY MISSIONS 10 YEARS AFTER 9/11 7 (2011); GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1; GAO-08-897T,
supra note 149, AT 1.
156. See 4O U.S.C.A. § 1315(a)-(b)(1).
157. See Department Of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, PUB. L. NO. 111-83, 123 Stat.
2142 (2010); Secretary Napolitano Announces Transfer, supra note 7.
158. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-06-29, FPS RELATED FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM
GSA TO DHS 1 (2006) (stating Chairman James Oberst's and her concern that the effectiveness of FPS
has been compromised since its placement inside ICE); Secretary Napolitano Announces Transfer, supra
note 7.
159. Secretary Napolitano Announces Transfer, supra note 7.
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[would] enhance oversight and efficiency while maximizing the
Department's overall effectiveness in protecting federal buildings across the
country."'6 ° She went on to state: "The realignment allows FPS to focus on
its primary mission-securing General Services Administration (GSA)-
owned and leased federal buildings by performing building security
assessments and deploying appropriate countermeasures-while enabling
ICE to focus on the smart and effective enforcement of immigration and
customs laws." 161
Going beyond the language of the relevant laws, the historical context
in which the Homeland Security Act was drafted obviates the legislative
intent to strengthen national security and enhance the nation's ability to
protect against and prevent future terrorist acts domestically.162  The
terrorist attacks of 9/11 are difficult to forget.163 The Comptroller General
of the United States, who is the head of GAO, said the following in a 2011
statement to Congress:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to profound
changes in government agendas, policies and structures to
confront homeland security threats facing the nation. Most
notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
began operations in 2003 with key missions that included
preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United
States, reducing the country's vulnerability to terrorism,
and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may
164
occur.
The fear and concern regarding a future attack was not an abstract or
irrational fear; rather, it was a near and immediate concern.165  David
Wright of the American Federation of Government Employees, the




162. See Sarah T. Zaffina, Note, For Whom The Bell Tolls: The New Human Resources
Management System at The Department Of Homeland Security Sounds The Death Knell For A Uniform
Civil Service, 14 FED. CIR. B. J. 705, 707 (2004) (stating that "[i]n the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, Congress created a new executive agency, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), with a primary mission to protect the United States against future terrorist attacks.");
GAO -1 1-940T, supra note 155, AT 1.
163. See Zaffina, supra note 162, at 707; GAO -I 1-940T, supra note 155, AT 1.
164. GAO-I 1-940T, supra note 155, at highlights to the report.
165. Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?, supra note 59, at 47
(statement of David L. Wright).
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In today's dynamic threat environment, our high profile,
high risk [f]ederal workplaces demand the investment
required to use [f]ederal law-enforcement officers to protect
[f]ederal properties. . . . Making the necessary reforms to
this agency and increasing the number of [f]ederal police
officers on duty are not a matter of responding to vague,
unsubstantiated warnings. The threat and immediate danger
is quite real. The writing is on the wall. 66
Military Humvees roamed the streets of our nation's capital and were
often parked alongside tanks in front of federal buildings.167  Barricades
were hastily set-up all around the Capitol and congressional office
buildings.168  An overwhelming disquiet and sense of disempowerment
flowed from a concern that our national security apparatus was ill-equipped
to prevent or respond to what appeared to be an imminent threat that gave
no warning.169 The real terror that the events of 9/11 engendered spurred a
sense of urgency that even Congress, an institution disinclined towards
rapid action, could not ignore.17' The DHS Act was first proposed in
Congress by then President George W. Bush on June 18, 2002,17' and was
passed into law on November 25, 2002.172
These reports are valuable insights regarding Congress's intentions
when passing the DHS Act. Lars Noah suggests that courts make an error
when they overemphasize deference to the agency's interpretation of the
enabling statute (post-promulgation of the act) and should resort more to
166. Id.
167. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 2.
In addition, reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the
importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist surveillance
teams, which frequently use information such as the placement of armed guards
and proximity to law enforcement agency stations when choosing targets and
planning attacks. These sophisticated surveillance and research techniques can
potentially be derailed by active law enforcement patrols in and around federal
facilities.
Id.
168. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY, GAO-03-435, RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY: SOME
ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN TO ENHANCE RAIL SECURITY, BUT RISK-BASED PLAN NEEDED 11 (2003)
(discussing the use of barricades in railroad stations after the September 11 attack.).
169. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1, 11-12 (stating that FPS faces numerous challenges like
inadequate amount of equipment, which could lead to risk to the public and federal buildings).
170. See Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition and Impede Progress, supra note 63, at
60-61 (statement of Stephen D. Amitay stating that slow actions of DHS, Nasco, RAMP, and Congress
impede the process of securing safety after the 9/11 attack).
171. See H.R. Doc. No. 107-227, at H3639 (2001) (a message from the President proposing the
Department of Homeland Security to organize and protect the nation against terrorism).
172. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § I11.
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legislative history, floor debates, pre-promulgation debates, and committee
hearings as interpretive guidance. 
173
The legislative intent can be seen in the committee reports and records
of the debates. In the process of passing the DHS Act, both houses of
Congress were unambiguous in their intention to protect the security of
federal buildings and facilities. 74  The House Select Committee on
Homeland Security was responsible for writing the DHS Act.'75 In its
Committee Report, it stated the purpose of the Homeland Security Act of
2002:
[The Act] will create the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to provide for the security of the American people,
territory, and sovereignty within the United States. The
Department of Homeland Security will help fulfill the
Constitutional responsibility of the [flederal government by
providing for the common defense by uniting, under a
single department those elements within the government
whose primary responsibility is to secure the United States
homeland. This department will have the mission of
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States,
reducing the United States' vulnerability to terrorism,
minimizing the damages from attacks, and assisting in
recovery from any attacks, should they occur.
176
The House Committee Report specifically acknowledged an important
constitutional duty for the federal government to protect against terrorism
and, therefore, pushed for the creation of the Department in order to help
fulfill that responsibility.
177
Likewise, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, the then Chair
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, issued a Committee Report that
also acknowledged 9/1 I's horrific impression on the American psyche.178
173. Noah, supra note 149, at 282.
174. 40 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the DHS was
responsible for protecting federal "buildings, grounds, and property ... owned, occupied, or secured by
the Federal Government. .. ").
175. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-609, pt. I at 1,63 (2002).
176. Id. at 63 (statement of Rep. Armey, Member, Select Comm. on Homeland Security).
177. See id.; Thompson, supra note 3, at 281.
178. S. Rep. No. 107-175, at 1-2 (2002).
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a horrific wake-up call for the
nation .... Suddenly, U.S. citizens realized that warfare had changed and they
were vulnerable as civilians in their home towns, simply going about their daily
lives.
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The Committee Report went on to explain the intended role for a new DHS,
saying, "[t]he new department would provide new leadership on a range of
homeland threats, including terrorism, by consolidating a range of federal
agencies and programs responsible for border security, critical infrastructure
protection, and emergency preparedness and response."'79 Other Senators
similarly testified regarding the need for the nation to unite against terrorism
and bolster security with the DHS Act, including former Senator Byron
Dorgan from North Dakota1 80 and former Senator Joe Lieberman from
Connecticut. 181
Congress's endorsement of some privatization of the Department's
responsibilities was conditioned on an expectation that any such
privatization would enhance, not hinder, homeland security.8 2 As Tom
Delay stated:
To be organized effectively and function efficiently, the
Homeland Security Department must be consolidated,
flexible, and readily accountable to its Secretary. We
simply cannot afford to invest this new department with the
ponderous inefficiency that hobbles much of the federal
bureaucracy. The safety and security of the United States is
reason enough to design a Homeland Security Department
that is responsive, adaptable, innovative, and aggressively
focused on a single defining mission.
83
Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 8-9.
180. 148 CONG. REC. S8185 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dorgan). Senator Dorgan
stated:
We have a lot to do with respect to the needs in this country, and the requirement
that we all get together, work together, stay together, to fight terrorism and do
what we must as Americans to respond to this threat.
Id.
181. Id. at S8186 (statement of Sen. Lieberman). Senator Lieberman stated:
Look at the title of the amendment, the proposed bill: The National Homeland
Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002. It clearly is the intention of our
committee not just to create a Department of Homeland Security, which is, of
course critical, but to combat terrorism. Terrorism goes beyond homeland
security. It goes beyond the Department of Homeland Security.
Id.
182. Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition and Impede Progress?, supra note 63, at 47
(statement of David Wright).
183. Transforming the Federal Government to Protect America from Terrorism Before the Select
Comm. on Homeland Security House of Representatives, 107 Cong. (2002) (prepared statement of the
Hon. Tom Delay).
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Together, these statements demonstrate the legislature's intent to protect the
nation's critical infrastructure and to combat terrorism.18 4 The language of
the congressional Committees that were primarily responsible for writing
the DHS Act and the language of the Members of Congress involved in
passing the Act, undoubtedly show an intent to enhance our national
security and fully protect federal buildings and facilities.1
8 5
The legislative record from the debates underscores a clear purpose.
186
As Senator Dorgan from North Dakota stated, "[T]his is a case where if we
make a mistake, the safety of the American people is at stake. So homeland
security is critically important."187 Some Members of Congress specifically
stated how important it was that the new Department provide more federal
police and investigators than existed before 9/11.188
The Secretary [of Homeland Security] may designate
employees of the Department of Homeland Security,
including employees transferred to the Department from the
Office of the [FPS] of the [GSA] pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as officers and agents for duty in
connection with the protection of property owned or
occupied by the Federal Government and persons on the
property including duty in areas outside the property.1
89
Indeed, one of the "Performance Goals and Objectives" of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 was to "create a flexible and inviting environment to
recruit, manage, train and retain a world-class work force."190 This suggests
that the responsibility of protecting should be primarily entrusted to federal
employees. 191
184. 148 CONG. REC. S8352-8367 (Daily ed. Sept. 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
185. Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition and Impede Progress?, supra note 63, at 46
(statement of David L. Wright).
186. See Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?, supra note 59,
47 (statement of David Wright); Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition and Impede Progress?,
supra note 63, at 53-54 (statement of David L.Wright).
Since 2001, while FPS has decreased and the risk of attack on Federal facilities
has increased, . . . [t]he sole Federal agency charged with the critical mission of
protecting thousands of Federal buildings and millions of Federal employees and
visitors from terrorist and criminal attack, the Federal Protective Service is now
within NPPD, but still remains an agency in crisis.
Id. at 54.
187. 148 CONG. REC. S9056 (Daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
188. Seeid. at S9063.
189. H.R. Rep. No. 107-609 pt. 1, at 60 (statement of Rep. Armey).
190. Id. at 75.
191. See id. at 60.
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Given that federal building security is central to the demonstrated
legislative intent to enhance Homeland Security and the specific intent to
fully protect federal facilities, it appears that FPS's ability to privatize is
more limited than the earlier discussed DHS Act provisions indicate.192 The
earlier references are but portions of an overall statute, and under the usual
cannons of statutory interpretation, it is ill advised to interpret a meaning to
a particular provision that is repugnant to the overall statute.193 Applying
the broad and expansive privatization authority found within the Federal
Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") in isolation is inconsistent with the
legislative intent behind the DHS Act to the extent that expansive FPS
workforce reductions and privatization effectively diminish national
security in general and federal facility security in particular.
1 94
For instance, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton expressed her
concern, which she shared with Chairman James Oberstar, that the
effectiveness of FPS has been compromised since its placement inside
ICE. 95  Senator Joe Lieberman expressed his dismay about budget
shortfalls within FPS, which reduced training, hiring, and the purchase of
new equipment. 196 As was discussed in Part II, FPS faces numerous
challenges, and among those challenges are equipment challenges that could
192. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 11; 48 C.F.R. § 1.301 (2001):
(a)(1) Subject to the authorities in paragraph (c) below and other statutory
authority, an agency head may issue or authorize the issuance of agency
acquisition regulations that implement or supplement the FAR and incorporate,
together with the FAR, agency policies, procedures, contract clauses, solicitation
provisions, and forms that govern the contracting process or otherwise control the
relationship between the agency, including any of its suborganizations, and
contractors or prospective contractors.
(2) Subject to the authorities in (c) below and other statutory authority, an agency
head may issue or authorize the issuance of internal agency guidance at any
organizational level (e.g., designations and elegations of authority, assignments
of responsibilities, work-flow procedures, and internal reporting requirements)
(d) Agency acquisition regulations implementing or supplementing the FAR are,
for-
(1) The military departments and defense agencies, issued subject to the.authority
of the Secretary of Defense.
193. See Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
194. See Homeland Security Act of 2002; 6 U.S.C.S. § I11.
195. See Letter from James Oberstar and Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman and Chairwoman, H.
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, to members of Comm. On Appropriations (Sept. 9, 2009)
(statement of then Sub-committee ranking member Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton).
196. See The Federal Protective Service: Time for Reform, supra note 12, at I (opening statement
of Senator Joseph Lieberman).
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lead to increased risks to the public and federal buildings.,97 There were
also unresolved workforce issues that led to the decrease of employee
numbers and police officer positions with the FPS.'98 According to FPS
officials, the decreases in FPS's workforce are primarily the result of cost-
saving measures taken to address its budgetary challenges.199 As the
Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues testified before the House of
Representatives:
Due to staffing and operational issues, FPS is experiencing
difficulties in fully meeting its facility protection mission.
According to many FPS officials at regions we visited,
these difficulties may expose federal facilities to a greater
risk of crime or terrorist attack .... One consequence of this
change is that, in many federal facilities FPS is not
providing proactive patrol in and around federal facilities in
order to detect and prevent criminal incidents and terrorism
related activities before they occur. . . . FPS continues to
face several management challenges that many FPS
officials at regions we visited say have hampered its ability
to achieve its mission and increased the risk of criminal and
terrorist attacks on federal employees, facilities, and
members of the public.2 °0
Furthermore, full-time federal workforce reduction undermines the
Department's ability to engage in the full-time interdiction and terrorism
prevention efforts that motivated the formation of the Department.20 ' Given
that Congress, by enacting the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
unequivocally intended for the enhancement of homeland security and the
inclusive protection of federal buildings and facilities, FPS's discretional
ability to privatize its inherently governmental functions undermines
congressional goals and the DHS mandate.20 2
197. See GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1-3.
198. Id. at 3, 5-7.
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id. at 1-2.
201. See GAO-08-897T, supra note 149, at 7.
202. See GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1-2. Gary Schenkel, Director of FPS, stated:
[W]e have not ruled out the possibility of expanding our Federal workforce, or
Federalizing or partially Federalizing the contract-security-guard workforce. We
expect to complete the bottom-up staffing review currently underway, in time to
inform the fiscal year 2012 budget request. In the interim, the Department
remains committed to ensuring the organization is appropriately staffed, as
evidenced by the 2009, 2010, and 2011 budget requests, which were all equal to,
or exceeding the 1,200 full-time-equivalent staffing level directed by Congress.
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There are no cases that unequivocally state that "any particular
governmental service may not be contracted out to private providers" in
terms of privatization of administrative functions, and Clayton Gillette and
Paul Stephan found that courts have little to say about it.203 Due to the lack
of cases dealing directly with the privatization process, Gillette and Stephan
examine three areas where privatization is subject to structural
limitations.2 °4 First, courts consider cases where the issue is whether
constitutional rules that apply to governmental actors also apply to private
actors. 205 Then, they address administrative decisions to contract out
206governmental functions. Lastly, they conducted a survey on the
"constitutions of several states and how they affect privatization.'20 7
Other than the legislative and administrative regulations and guidelines
set forth by the United States Code ("U.S.C."), FAR, and the Code of
Federal Regulations ("C.F.R."), there is no unequivocal judicial authority
banning the government from contracting with private parties to provide
any particular governmental service.20 8 In fact, a review of Supreme Court
decisions demonstrates that the courts have little to say about privatization
of public functions and that it is difficult to identify any function that has
been categorized as inherently public as a matter of constitutional law.
20 9
Gillete and Stephan found that the constitutional limitations to privatization
are procedural rather than substantive, and that even in areas where the
government is required to have some role, there is an apparent room for
privatization, which is permissible so long as the arrangement between the
government and the private actors limit the discretion of the private firms.
210
Although there is evidence of legislative intent that ought to bar overly
expansive privatization efforts within FPS, this does not create a bar that
can effectively curtail excessive FPS privatization.211 This is because courts
are generally reluctant to enforce a nonspecific statutory purpose to
constrain agency discretion.212  This is especially true in regard to
Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical Facilities?, supra note 59, at 5-7
(statement of Gary Schenkel).
203. Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan lII, Constitutional Limits on Privatization, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 481, 482 (1998).




208. See Gillette & Stephan, supra note 203, at 482.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 501.
211. See 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d) (2006).
212. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that an agency
statutory interpretation calls for Chevron deference when it is apparent that "Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of such authority."); Whitman v. Am.
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procurement of resources that an agency deems necessary to fulfill its
functions.1 3 Here the federal courts typically invoke the political question
doctrine, leaving such matters to the two political branches to resolve.
21 4
Skidmore v. Swift2 15 stands as precedent for federal courts deferring to
agency interpretations of law and opinions.21 6 As Jerry L. Mashaw
suggests, the Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel21 7 opinion
establishes that while agency rulemaking is autonomous in nature, "the
combination of law-making and interpretive responsibility in administrative
institutions is constitutionally appropriate because it can be directed,
checked, and controlled by the political branches.,2 18 Furthermore, federal
courts are generally reluctant to enforce a nonspecific statutory purpose as a
constraint on agency discretion.21 9
The problem with applying the implicit limitations within the DHS Act
is that the Department and FPS are unlikely to define their own actions as
undermining federal facility security.220  However, there remains no
effective measure for the limitations and there is no enforcement
mechanism in place. Hence, the legislative intent of the DHS Act itself is
not a reliable bar to massive and excessive delegations of the FPS security
function, which is essential to homeland security.
Trucking Ass'n Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-75, 479-80 (2001) (holding that a legislative act, Clean Air Act
bars an executive agency Environmental Protection Agency from considering implementation costs but
the delegation of authority to EPA "protect public health" was not unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power and that final agency action is subject to judicial review); Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (ruling that courts, in construing the extent and scope of an agency
rulemaking power and discretion, should exercise deference to an administrator's interpretation of a
statute unless Congress has spoken directly to the question at hand. "If the intent of the Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter ...." If the court has determined that the intent of the legislature is
ambiguous, then the reviewing court should defer to the interpretation of the agencies so long as it is
permissible and reasonable construction of the statute.); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)
(holding that Federal courts may yield to the expertise and capacities of different agencies.
Interpretations and opinions of the agency deserve deference so long as the agency has shown body of
experience and expertise on the issue at hand).
213. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40; Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory
Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U TORONTO L. J. 497, 509-11 (2005) (arguing that
although agency rulemaking is autonomous in nature, the power to lawmaking and interpretive
responsibility is constitutionally valid so long as agencies can still be directed, checked and controlled by
political branches); Jayna Richardson, Outsourcing & OMB Circular A-76: Sixth Circuit Opens the
Door to Federal Employee Challenges of Agency Determinations, 28 PUB. CONT. L. J. 203, 205-06
(1999) (arguing that the decision to outsource depends whether the agency thinks that the functions to be
outsourced must be performed by governmental employees).
214. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (holding that claim challenging Pennsylvania's
congressional redistricting plan as political gerrymander was a non-justiciable political question).
215. 323 U.S. 134.
216. Id. at 137-40.
217. 467 U.S. 837.
218. Mashaw, supra note 213, at 511.
219. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
220. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
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Absent a regulatory or statutory basis for limiting the executive
branch's privatization of vital federal national security functions, the
remaining hope is for a broader constitutional limitation that bars the
delegation of such an important function, or inherently governmental
221function, to private actors.
B. Outsourcing and Privatization Authority under the DHS Act
The DHS Act includes sections that specifically authorize the creation
of the Department and its agencies.222 Within the DHS Act are provisions
that reference the Department's general authority to outsource or privatize
departmental functions.223 Section 393 of the DHS Act provides: "The
Secretary may use the authorities set forth in this section with respect to any
procurement ... if the Secretary determines in writing that the mission of
the Department . . . would be seriously impaired without the use of such
authorities.,224 Hence, the DHS Act's purpose is to enhance security-not
to decrease or in any way diminish the scope of federal facility security.225
Minimally, this indicates the legislature's intent not to augment or otherwise
reorganize the federal workforce in a manner that diminishes homeland
security.226
The DHS Act further states: "The primary mission of the Department is
to (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (C) minimize the damage
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the
United States.,227 This translates into a mandate to fully and effectively
protect the nation from terrorist attacks. However, "Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies" are vested with the "primary responsibility for
investigating and prosecuting" terrorists. 8 Accordingly, the DHS Act also
grants the Department the authority to coordinate its security efforts with
other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.229 The DHS Act
further provides for a Special Assistant to the Secretary "who [is]
221. Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-be-met Challenges for
Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749,774 (2011).
222. 6 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2007); Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 111; 48 C.F.R.
§ 1.302 (West 2016) (the FAR does allow agencies to supplement the FAR, yet these are limited to
statutes that implement the FAR while serving the specific needs of the particular agency).
223. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 11l(b); 6 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2015)
(enumerates and describes the functions of the Secretary of DHS); 6 U.S.C.A. § 113 (West 2015)
(describes other officers and their functions).
224. 6 U.S.C.A. § 393 (West 2015).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § II (b)(l)(A)-(C).
228. Id. at (b)(2).
229. 6 U.S.C.A § 361(a)(b) (West 2015).
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responsible for creating and fostering strategic communications with the
private sector to enhance the primary mission of the Department to protect
the American homeland.,230 This demonstrates a general authority to use
private contractors to aid in the Homeland Security mission.3
The FAR governs the acquisition process regarding all government
23contracts.2 The FAR includes a list of functions that are "generally not
considered to be inherently governmental," including, "(1) Services that
involve or relate to budget preparation ... (3) Services that involve or relate
to analysis, feasibility studies and strategy options to be used by agency
personnel in developing policy ... [and] (4) Services that involve or relate
to the development of regulations.,233 Notably, this list of non-inherently
governmental functions also includes:
(5) Services that involve or relate to the evaluation of
another contractor's performance . . . (7) Contractors
providing assistance in contract management (such as
where the contractor might influence official evaluations of
other contractors) . . . (18) Contractors providing legal
advice and interpretations of regulations and statutes to
Government officials.
234
This provision of the FAR has been interpreted to mean that these rules
"broadly outline procurement policies and procedures for the acquisition of
goods and services by the government on behalf of the American taxpayer.
It grants broad discretion to 'local procurement officials to take independent
actions based on their professional judgment' so as to obtain the 'best value
product or service.'' 235 Clearly this FAR provision, if taken in isolation,
provides expansive authority to privatize and outsource these functions. 236
However, this provision must be placed in the context of a regulated
agency. Therefore, in the context of DHS and FPS, the DHS Act will limit
the scope of privatization authority.
237
230. 6 U.S.C.A. § 112(f).
231. See id. at (b).
232. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (West 2016); 48 C.F.R. § 1.102 (West 2016).
233. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503 (d) (1)-(4) (West 2016).
234. Id. at (d)(5), (7), (18).
235. See Wood v. United States, 290 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2002); see Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218;
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 458, 473-75,479-80; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137-39.
236. See Wood, 290 F.3d at 34; see Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-
75, 479-80; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
237. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § 11 l(b); 6 U.S.C.A. § 203(3) (West 2015); 40
U.S.C.A. § 1315(a).
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The DHS Act incorporates and transfers FPS's previous responsibilities
into its role in the newly formed DHS.238  The DHS Act grants FPS
authority to retain all functions it previously had in the GSA.239 Relatedly,
40 U.S.C. § 1315(a) grants that:
To the extent provided for by transfers made pursuant to the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of Homeland
Security (in this section referred to as the "Secretary") shall
protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned,
occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including
any agency, instrumentality, or wholly owned or mixed-
ownership corporation thereof) and the persons on the
240property.
This translates into a broad mandate of authority to use private contractors
to perform government functions that are generally authorized under the
FAR.241
However, the FPS section of the statute requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security to protect the buildings and property of the federal
242government. It also allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to
designate any employee of the Department as an officer or agent to protect
property and persons on the property owned by the federal government.243
In sum, the DHS Act and related laws and regulations together provide
broad privatization authority.244
IV. EXCESSIVE PRIVATIZATION RAISES CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The congressional mandate to strengthen homeland security, embodied
in passages of the DHS Act, is at odds with the broad privatization of vital
FPS functions and undermines security.245  Furthermore, excessive
privatization raises fundamental constitutional concerns regarding the
appropriate role and duties of government and the question of what limit, if
any, ought to be placed on delegations of governmental duties to private
238. 6 U.S.C. § 203(3) (2002). By virtue of this Act, the following functions were transferred to
the Secretary of the DHS: the US Customs Service and The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
of the Department of the Treasury, the TSA of the Department of Transportation, the FPS of the General
Services Administration, and the Office for Domestic Preparedness of the Office of Justice Programs,
including the related functions of the Attorney General Office. Id.
239. Id.
240. 40 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a).
241. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 1.102.
242. 40 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a).
243. Id. at(b)(1).
244. See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-1717.
245. See generally GAO-10-341, supra note 35.
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actors.2 46 The concern is embodied in the statutory and regulatory policy
statements that limit the delegation of inherently governmental functions.247
Doctrines regarding inherently governmental fhnctions and the private
delegation doctrine are rooted in a longstanding recognition that privatizing
essential public functions or, as Paul Verkuil frames it, "outsourcing
sovereignty," undermines democracy.248
Courts have undermined the constitutional limitations on both public
and private delegation in order to fit the needs of an increasingly complex
administrative state.249 Despite the legitimate policy concerns with limiting
the government's flexibility to delegate some of its functions in order to
enhance efficiency, the original policy concern, that some duties are too
inherently governmental and too fundamental to be outsourced, remains
salient.25°
This Section begins by considering the constitutional law concerns with
FPS privatization by presenting the relevant policies and doctrines such as
the inherently governmental function and private delegation doctrines.
Next, despite the existence of these doctrines, this Section shows how the
post-Lochner era appreciation for the special needs of the complex
administrative state has effectively eliminated the enforcement of private
delegation limits. Finally, this Section concludes by distinguishing
excessive FPS privatization from the policy driving the post-Lochner
leniency towards the administrative state. Even where a function-in this
context, FPS security-is generally not considered an inherently
governmental function, it is not constitutionally permissible to excessively
privatize an agency's core functions to the point that fundamental
governmental duties are undermined.1
A. Limitations on Public and Private Delegation
Limitations on government delegations are typically framed in two
252contexts. 2 Most relevant to this discussion is the private delegationcontext.253 Here, delegating government's fundamental duties to private
246. See JOHN R. LUCKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40641, INHERENTLY
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2-3 (2009) (section "The Constitutional Grounding for the Public/Private
Debate").
247. See id. at 11.
248. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 4, 102-04.
249. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes & The
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 422 (2008).
250. See Minow, supra note 152, at 1014.
251. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 27-28 (section "Replacing 'Inherently Governmental
Functions' with Another Construct").
252. See id. at 20.
253. Id.
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actors is of concern. 4  Today, the private delegation concern is typically
framed as a policy rather than a constitutionally-required limitation on
delegating inherently governmental functions.255 As a general matter,
inherently governmental functions cannot be delegated to private actors.256
The other context is public delegation, where the nondelegation doctrine
imposes a constitutional law-based limitation on delegating the powers of
one branch of the federal government to another. 7  The public delegation
concerns are typically based in a separation of powers dilemma.2 8
Different law and governance concerns animate the nondelegation
doctrine and the private delegation-based inherent governmental function
doctrine.259  Despite these distinct concerns, the post-Lochner Era legal
philosophy of providing deference toward the actions of the political
branches of government has influenced the simultaneous demise of both the
private and public delegation doctrines.260 As a result, delegation of
governmental duties to private entities is nearly as difficult to legally
challenge as delegations of governmental duties to different branches of
government.26' In the context of the FPS, the real homeland security gaps
254. Id.
255. See id at 38-40 (section "Focusing on Questions of Contracting Policy").
256. 31 U.S.C § 501 (1982); Performance of Commercial Activities, Exec. Order No. 12615, 52
Fed. Reg. 44,853, 44,853 (Nov. 19, 1987) ("Ensure that new Federal Government requirements for
commercial activities are provided by private industry, except where statute or national security requires
government performance or where private industry costs are unreasonable"); see 48 C.F.R. § 2.101
(2016) (stating that the modem definition inherently governmental function is: as a matter of policy, a
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government
employees); see also Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n MEBA v. Pena, 78 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 1996)
("Unlike the PES, the legislative history of the OFPPAA evinces an interest in preserving federal
employment when that employment involves inherently governmental functions"); Martin v.
Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The LOGCAP regulations expressly state that
'[c]ontractors will not be used to perform inherently governmental function'); Arrowhead Metals v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 703, 706-07 (1985) (holding that coinage of money is inherently governmental
function); Fairfax, supra note 20, at 291 ("The FAR is clear in its policy stance against contracting out
certain core government functions: 'Contracts shall not be used for the performance of inherently
governmental functions."'); Minow, supra note 152, at 1014 ("A longstanding executive policy, now
expressed in Office of Management and Budget (the 'OMB') Circular No. A-76, directs that inherently
governmental functions should not be outsourced."); VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra
note 25, at 121-22.
257. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2103 (2004) (section "The First Postulate-Nondelegation").
258. Id. at2103-04.
259. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 20-22 (section "Judicial Decisions"); see also Merrill,
supra note 257, at 2103-10 (section "The First Postulate-Nondelegation").
260. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 20-22 (section "Judicial Decisions"); see also Daniel
J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Defense, Judicial Review, And The Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941,
1000 (1999).
261. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 20-22 (section "Judicial Decisions"); see also Merrill,
supra note 257, at 2103-10 (section "The First Postulate-Nondelegation").
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that result from excessive private delegation are not subject to clear
constitutional limits.
262
Federal facility security is the core of the FPS mission.263 While the
FPS federal facility security mission is clearly an important governmental
function,264 not every important governmental function is characterized as
an "inherently governmental function.,265  An inherently governmental
function is "a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance by Government employees." 266 According to the
FAR, an inherently governmental function is,
as a matter of policy, a function that is so intimately related
to the public interest as to mandate performance by
Government employees. . . . Governmental functions
normally fall into two categories: the act of governing, i.e.,
the discretionary exercise of Government authority, and
monetary transactions and entitlements. (1) An inherently
governmental function involves, among other things, the
interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States
so as to- (i) Bind the United States to take or not to take
some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization,
order, or otherwise; (ii) Determine, protect, and advance
United States economic, political, territorial, property, or
other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or
criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or
otherwise; (iii) Significantly affect the life, liberty, or
property of private persons; (iv) Commission, appoint,
direct, or control officers or employees of the United States;
or; (v) Exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or
262. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 20-22 (section "Judicial Decisions").
263. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.S. § II l(b)(1); see Examining the Federal
Protective Service: Are Federal Facilities Secure? Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldg. and Emergency Mgmt., 1I3th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Director
L. Eric Patterson) (The mission of FPS "is charged with protecting and delivering integrated law
enforcement and security services to more than 9,000 facilities owned or leased by the General Services
Administration [GSA] and safeguarding more than 1.4 million daily occupants and visitors.").
264. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101; see 40 U.S.CA. § 1315(a), (b)(l) (subsection (a) provides that DHS in
general "shall protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the
Federal Government" while subsection (b) allows DHS to delegate the task to FPS.).
265. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 31.
266. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101; see also Minow, supra notel52, at 1014 ("A longstanding executive
policy, now expressed in Office of Management and Budget (the 'OMB') Circular No. A-76, directs that
inherently governmental functions should not be outsourced"); LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 55
(One is a statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of
1998.31, this definition states that an inherently governmental function is "a function [that is] so
intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.").
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disposition of the property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, of the United States, including the collection,
control, or disbursement of federal fund.267
Within the current federal law and policy, two main definitions of
"inherently governmental functions" currently exist.268  The first is a
statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal Activities Inventory
Reform (FAIR) Act of 1997.269 This definition states that an inherently
governmental function is "a function that is so intimately related to the
public interest as to require performance by Federal Government
employees.'270 The second is a policy-oriented definition, contained in
OMB Circular A-76.27' This definition states that an inherently
governmental activity is:
[A]n activity that is so intimately related to the public
interest as to mandate performance by government
personnel. Other statutes and regulations that define
inherently governmental functions do so either by
reproducing the language of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular
A-76, or by incorporating the definitions of the FAIR Act
or OMB Circular A-76 by reference
272
Federal courts determine whether a governmental function is considered to
be inherently governmental by deciding if the duty is so intimately related
to the public interest that the function mandates performance by
273Government employees. For example, in the U.S. Court of Claims case
of Arrowhead Metals, LTD v. United States,274 "coinage production" was
deemed to be an inherently governmental function.275 In that case, a private
contractor claimed to be the low bidder at bid opening and "challenged legal
viability of United States Mint's cancellation of bid solicitation subsequent
to opening of sealed bids.276 The Court of Claims held that the Department
of Treasury's decision was not baseless and that the decision to cancel the
bid was based "upon concern as to whether contracting out such functions
267. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
268. LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 26.
269. Id. at 8.
270. Id. at 9.
271. Id. at 12.
272. Id. at 7.
273. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (stating that the modern definition inherently governmental function is: as
a matter of law and policy, must be performed by Federal government employees and cannot be
contracted out because it is intimately related to the public interest).
274. 8 Cl. Ct. 703.
275. Id. at 717 (holding that coinage of money is inherently governmental function).
276. Id. at 703.
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to private sector was consistent with United States Mint's responsibility."277
There was also "concern about potential ramifications of national security
aspects of coin blanking by the private sector, especially in foreign
countries, the government function aspect of blanking took on added
significance. The decision to cancel under the circumstances was thus
'compelling,' as well as reasonable and rational.,278 Therefore, the decision
to cancel the bid was upheld because, inter alia, coinage production is an
inherently governmental function as there is a national security concern in
coin blanking.
279
The FPS security function is similar to the one involved in Arrowhead
because of the vital nature of the federal facilities FPS protects; the
protection of FBI facilities and congressional district offices, for instance, is
essential to our nation. 20 Yet, current statutory and regulatory law does not
treat functions like FPS building security as rising to the level of being an
inherently governmental function.28 1 According to 48 C.F.R. § 2.101:
Inherently governmental functions do not normally include
gathering information for or providing advice, opinions,
recommendations, or ideas to Government officials. They
also do not include functions that are primarily ministerial
and internal in nature, such as building security, mail
operations, operation of cafeterias, housekeeping, facilities
operations and maintenance, warehouse operations, motor
vehicle fleet management operations, or other routine
electrical or mechanical services.282
277. Id.
278. Id. at 715.
279. Arrowhead Metals, 8 CI. Ct. at 717.
[T]he cancellation served the interests of the government by allowing for further
study of the important policy issue of contracting out work that may well involve
inherently Governmental functions. Further, such a course of action allows for
consideration and definement of the legislative and executive roles and limitations
in the critical national policy areas of coinage and potentially national security
(integrity of national coinage, risks in private sector, especially plants in foreign
countries, e.g., counterfeiting).
Id.
280. SHAWN REESE, FEDERAL BUILDING AND FACILITY SECURITY: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 4 (2014).
281. See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at 31.
282. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
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B. Complex Administrative State
Over time, the needs of a complex administrative state have become a
more frequently cited basis for ignoring concerns regarding inherently
governmental functions.283 For example, the scope of what is considered an
inherently governmental function is limited because of a perceived need to
grant discretion to the executive broad when addressing the needs of a
complex administrative state.284 The executive branch possesses a unique
institutional competency that places it in the best position to determine the
appropriate and most efficient allocation of resources and responsibilities to
fulfill the function.285 John Luckey notes that in this context:
Congress has several options if it is concerned that
deficiencies in the existing definitions of inherently
governmental functions may lead agencies to improperly
contract out such functions. Options include (1) relying
upon recent statutory changes and/or the policies of the
Obama Administration, which proposes to limit contracting
out generally, to effect desired changes in agency
contracting; (2) changing the existing definition of
"inherently governmental functions"; (3) placing limits on
contracting out or use of appropriated funds; (4) addressing
structural factors potentially prompting agencies to rely on
contractors; (5) providing for more effective oversight of
283. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-06 (1946) (ruling that delegation of
authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting
power among security holders is constitutional); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989)
The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that
underlies our tripartite system of Government. The Constitution provides that
'[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States,' U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 1, and we long have insisted that 'the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution' mandate
that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.
Id.; Marshall Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (stating that "Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution."); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26
(1944) ("Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least
possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers."); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 225, (1943) (ruling that delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate
broadcast licensing "as public interest, convenience, or necessity" required).
284. Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2005) ("There is
nothing inherently governmental about a hospital[;]" thus, the hospital was not entitled to sovereign
immunity).
285. See Am. Power Light, 329 U.S. at 105; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; Marshall Field, 143 U.S.
at 692.
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executive branch contracting decisions; and (6) focusing
more on questions of contracting policy (i.e., what
functions should the government perform?) than on
contracting law (i.e., what functions must the government
perform?). The 111th Congress has enacted or is
considering several bills addressing inherently
governmental functions, including P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-84,
P.L.111- 117, H.R. 1436, H.R. 2142, H.R. 2177, H.R. 2682,
H.R. 2736, H.R. 2868, and S. 924.286
Congress can resolve the excessive delegation of inherently governmental
functions to private actors though its existing powers.287 The issue then
becomes a question of what to do when the executive and legislative
branches fail to adequately protect security. The constant invocation of the
complexities of the administrative state to shield privatization from
constitutional scrutiny provides a dangerously overbroad cover for
permitting excessive delegations of governmental functions to private
actors.288 According to Harel and Porat:
The Constitution, with its enumerated powers and limits on
these powers, is the best and most logical starting point for
distinguishing between public and commercial functions...
[C]lose scrutiny indicates that, even in these contexts,
there are strong convictions against privatization. . . . As
many commentators that examine the history of these
institutions note, the opposition to these practices is not
merely instrumental; it is based on the belief that there are
legitimacy-based considerations that preclude the use of
private bodies in conducting certain tasks.289
Whether a delegation of lawmaking authority to the executive branch is
seen as violating the nondelegation doctrine depends upon constitutional
interpretation.290  Despite the continuing and expanding delegation of
congressional lawmaking powers to administrative agencies, no such
delegation has been found to violate the nondelegation doctrine since
286. LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 246, at Summary.
287. See id. at 22.
288. See Minow, supra note 152, at 1022-24 (discussing that reliance on private contractors puts
democracy in jeopardy because the idea checks and balances is lacking and thus privatization creates
lack of transparency); VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 25, at 26-30, 105, 196
(discussing the detrimental effects ofoutsourcing public services, which includes FPS).
289. Harel & Porat, supra note 221, at 772, 776-77.
290. See Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 692; Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104-06; Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 371-72; Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-26; Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 215-17.
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1935.291 For example, in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,292 the Court
held that Congress could delegate its lawmaking authority to the Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC).293 This case broadened the Court's
previous, post-Lochner Era holding from NBC v. U.S.29 4 where it similarly
upheld Congress's ability to delegate legislative functions to the Federal
Communications Commission (FEC).295  The more recent 1989 case,
Mistretta v. United States296 continues the post-Lochner era jurisprudence of
a weakened nondelegation doctrine by holding that the nondelegation
doctrine was not violated when the legislature delegated specific lawmaking
powers to the federal judiciary.297  Thus, delegation of Congress's
lawmaking power to the other branches of the federal government is well-
established.298
In Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Dep't of
Trans. ,299 air traffic controllers filed action against Secretary of Department
of Transportation and Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration
regarding privatization of air traffic control towers.300 Despite concerns that
"the Office of Management and Budget issued Circular A-76, which
governs the privatization of a government function and 'prohibits the
federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for
less cost by the private sector,"' the court held that this was not an
unconstitutional delegation of an inherently governmental function.
30 1
Among other things, the court deferred to the executive branch in matters
concerning its discretion as well as the needs of a complex administrative
state that require the court to show such deference.
302
Similarly, in American Power & Light Co., the Supreme Court
addressed whether Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to
303an executive agency, the Security Exchange Commission. Despite
legitimate nondelegation doctrine concerns, the Court held that this was not
291. Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 779-80, 785 (1948) (stating that "[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation of
authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes" and upholding Congress's ability to delegate power
under broad standards the authority to determine excessive profits).
292. 329 U.S. 90.
293. Id. at 104.
294. 319 U.S. 190.
295. Id. at 225-27.
296. 488 U.S. 361.
297. Id. at 374.
298. See id.; Lichter, 334 U.S. at 779-80, 785-86; Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104; Nat'l
Broad Co., 319 U.S. at 225-27.
299. 654 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2011).
300. Id. at 655.
301. Id. at 655-56, 659.
302. See id. at 657-59.
303. See Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104.
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an unconstitutional delegation of the congressional lawmaking function.3 °4
As in Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers, the Court relied upon notions of
deference to the executive in matters concerning its discretion as well as the
needs of a complex administrative state that requires courts to show such
deference.3 °5
The Supreme Court initially applied the nondelegation doctrine to bar
the delegation of lawmaking functions to the executive branch,30 6 only to
later bow to the argument of delegation as a necessity in a complex
administrative state.3 °7 The executive branch needs maximum flexibility
and discretion in interpreting the laws that govern it.308  If left unchecked,
the inherently governmental function doctrine could slip down the same
slippery slope that has all but destroyed the usefulness of the nondelegation
doctrine.30 9
304. Id.
305. Id. at 104-05.
306. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935) (holding that section of National Industrial Recovery
Act authorizing President to prohibit transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum
produced in excess of amount permitted by state is unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
notwithstanding introductory section declaring national emergency and providing in part that policy of
Congress is to eliminate unfair competition and to conserve natural resources).
307. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-74, 475-76; Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of
Separations of Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 492-93 n. 97, 513, (2011) (describing the ruling in
Whitman as an example of the Court's forgiving application of nondelegation doctrine citing Justice
Scalia opinion in that case that "we have 'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding
the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."').
308. See Paul R Verkuil, Public Law Limitations On Privatization Of Government Functions, 84
N.C. L. REV. 397, 420-422 (2006) [hereinafter Verkuil, Public Law Limitations]. Verkuil claims:
To decide if privatization has reached its limits, we must know whether 'inherent
functions' of government are being delegated .... But the constitutional theories
that might be employed to secure against this threat, such as the nondelegation
doctrine, have been around for a long time. In addition, statutory provisions, such
as the Subdelegation Act and judicial review provisions of the APA, can also play
a role in controlling delegations to private hands.
Id; Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 435 (1999). Seidenfeld argues:
Agency rulemaking requires some degree of public notoriety, which fosters
executive and legislative oversight of the policy the rule implements, and thereby
makes rules more democratically accountable than ad hoc agency decisions.
Rulemaking also creates the potential for more meaningful public participation in
the policy making process, which again bolsters the democratic foundation of
agency rules.
Id.; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (1997)
(arguing that "[a]gency discretion should be constrained. Excessive and unchecked agency discretion
creates a crisis of legitimacy in the administrative state ... [and] [t]he best way to constrain discretion is
to encourage competition among interest groups in rule making").
309. See Verkuil, Public Law Limitations, supra note 308, at 420-22.
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Despite the legal and constitutional constraints on privatization, neither
set of constraints will likely be judicially enforced to bar FPS privatization.
The federal courts are reluctant to enforce the sort of implied and
nonspecific statutory purpose that limits privatization authority under the
DHS Act against an agency.310  Likewise, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated a reluctance311 to constrain the executive branch's discretion
regarding delegations to private contractors.31 2
C. Homeland Security Concerns are Unique
The similarities between the Court's inherently governmental doctrine
jurisprudence and its nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence should not
obscure a fundamental difference.31 3 The inherently governmental doctrine
addresses a concern with privatizing government, while the nondelegation
doctrine addresses the appropriate allocation of lawmaking powers within
the federal government.31 4 At the heart of the nondelegation doctrine is a
concern regarding an imperial presidency-a fear that the executive branch
will become too powerful.1 5 This concern is rooted in the founding of the
United States-in attempt to avoid the monarchy of King George III, the
founders sought to provide a leader of limited power who was accountable
to the citizens of the United States.3 16
However justified nondelegation doctrine concerns may be, in the end
the executive is democratically elected and our most fundamental
democratic precepts regarding democratic governance within our
310. See Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 654 F.3d at 658-59; Takle, 402 F.3d at 770; Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1440-41 (2003) (combining with
private immunity from constitutional strictures, such delegations raise the danger that privatization will
undermine constitutional accountability by preventing individual enforcement of constitutional
constraints on government); Gillette & Stephan, supra note 203, at 482 ("In particular, we cannot find
any decision that unambiguously declares than any particular governmental service may not be
contracted out to private providers.").
311. Metzger, supra note 310, at 1415 ("[T]he pervasive thrust of the Court's recent decisions
strongly suggests that privatization is likely to result in a denial of state action."); Gillette & Stephan,
supra note 203, at 482.
312. See Nat 'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass 'n, 654 F.3d at 658-59.
313. See Verkuil, Public Law Limitations, supra note 308, at 420-22.
314. See id.
315. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 128 (1940) ("We find nothing ... indicating
any intention to abandon a principle acted upon since the Nation's founding under which the legislative
and executive departments have exercised complete and final authority to enter into contracts for
Government purchases.").
316. Eric Slauter, The Declaration of Independence and the new nation, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION To THOMAS JEFFERSON, 12, 20-22 (Frank Shuffelton ed. 2009) (discussing the despotic
nature of monarchial reign of King George III as one of the main reasons for the revolution and the
declaration of independent).
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constitutional structure remain intact.317  Conversely, the privatization of
government, or rather in our specific instance, the expansive and broad
privatization of the FPS security functions could potentially undermine our
core democratic precepts.318
The Constitution's separation of powers and due process requirements
prohibit the government from delegating certain types of powers to private
hands; private delegation risks placing government power outside
constitutional controls to ultimately bypass constitutional duties and
rights.19 Private contractors are not part of the constitutional governmental
structure of the United States, and are not primarily motivated by the public
good.320 Rather, private contractors are primarily motivated by profit.32 '
Public policy and, indeed, the U.S. Constitution recognize that he complete
privatization of government functions, especially in the context of homeland
security, undermines a central tenant of democratic government and,
specifically, the Department's primary mission.322
V. CONCLUSION
Real homeland security gaps have resulted from the enormous
delegation of vital security functions to private contractors.323 While
structural and budgetary concerns are common justifications for hiring
private security guards to do the work of federal police, the resulting
homeland security gaps undermine congressional intent and homeland
317. See SINGER, supra note 26, at 2 13-15 (arguing that privatization military and national security
firms pose threat to government's sovereignty and privatization has detrimental implications for
democracy); Alexander & Prakash, supra note 26, at 1329. This appeals to the historical work of John
Locke on nondelegation doctrine and democracy, and that "the conventional reading of Locke's
nondelegation maxim by suggesting that Locke opposed unauthorized law-or rulemaking, that is,
lawmaking by an institution not authorized by the people to engage in such lawmaking. He was not
merely opposing the power to convey votes in a legislature." Id.
318. See Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, InternationalLaw, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75, 145 (1998) (noting
that security companies may have created a greater danger for state sovereignty); Gillette & Stephan,
supra note 203, at 481-82 (arguing that there is procedural constitutional limitation to privatization).
319. See Verkuil, Public Law Limitations, supra note 308, at 420-22.
320. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377, 393 (2006) (describing private firms as
not being infused with the public interest, but rather as functioning as amoral, profit-maximizing actors
who decide whether to follow public policy and law by balancing the costs and benefits of doing so);
Gillette & Stephan, supra note 203, at 482.
321. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (holding that the existence of
corporations are merely dependent on the motivation to make profits); Bamberger, supra note 320, at
393.
322. See Minow, supra note 152, at 1016; Nicholas von Hoffman, Contract Killers: How
Privatizing the US. Military Subverts Public Oversight, HARPER'S MAG., June 2004, at 80 (noting that
utilization of private contractors has undermine "the military's accountability with respect to the size of
troop deployments overseas").
323. GAO-08-476T, supra note 8, at 1I.
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security.324 Furthermore, the privatization of government-here, through
the expansive and broad privatization of the FPS security functions-
undermines core precepts regarding democratic governance and
constitutional structure.325 These real security gaps in FPS indicate a need
for a revised private delegation doctrine.326 Congress and the courts must
revise both statutory and constitutional limitations on the delegation of
public functions to private parties.
324. Id.
325. See SINGER, supra note 26, at 213; Alexander & Prakash, supra note 26, at 1329.
326. See Verkuil, Public Law Limitations, supra note 308, at 420-22.
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